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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of intergenerational correlation of education in rural 
China by using a data from a large survey of households. Three generations who completed 
education during the period from pre-1949 to the beginning of the 2000s are included. The 
focus is on the influence of family class status (chengfen) on offspring education. Our 
investigation suggest that family class status is still important for the intergenerational 
transmission of education. The offspring of landlord/rich peasant families are more likely to 
achieve higher educational attainment, even though parental education, family wealth, and 
other family characteristics are the same. The unique determinant of the intergenerational 
transmission of education in the postreform era is found to be an education-oriented family 
culture, created as an intergenerational cultural rebound against class-based social 
discrimination during the Maoist era. We have also found that the cultural reaction is a 
combination of class-specific effects with cohort-specific effects. 
Keywords: education; intergenerational correlation; social class; social discrimination; 
family culture     
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  2Summary 
This paper examines the determinants of intergenerational correlation of education in rural 
China by using a data from a large survey of households. Three generations who completed 
education during the period from pre-1949 to the beginning of the 2000s are included. The 
focus is on the influence of family class status (chengfen) on offspring education. 
Our empirical results suggest that family class status, which is generally believed to have 
become irrelevant after the 1980s, is still important for the intergenerational transmission of 
education. The offspring of landlord/rich peasant families are more likely to achieve higher 
educational attainment, even though parental education, family wealth, and other family 
characteristics are the same.  
The unique determinant of the intergenerational transmission of education in the 
postreform era is found to be an education-oriented family culture, created as an 
intergenerational cultural rebound against class-based social discrimination during the 
Maoist era. This argument is supported by the finding that the degree of significance of the 
positive effect of landlord/rich peasant status on the education of offspring who completed 
education in the postreform era varies depending on social environment. The degree of 
significance is lower in non-multisurname villages, where class-based discrimination was 
supposed to be mitigated by kinship ties, than in multisurname villages.  
We have also found a cohort difference in the strength of the rebound effect. The 1947–
1953 birth cohort has positive attitudes toward children’s education that are distinct from 
differences in other family characteristics including class status. This finding implies a 
long-term response to social events in one’s adolescence, specifically, the turmoil in the 
education system in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. We have also found that this cohort 
effect is stronger in landlord/rich peasant families, who suffered from severe discrimination 
at that period. That is, the intergenerational cultural rebound is a compound of a class-
specific effect with a cohort-specific effect.  
Why, then, did rebound rather than resignation become the major form of reaction 
against class-based social discrimination in rural China? A common reaction of oppressed 
people against ‘long-standing deprivation’ is resignation rather than protest (Sen 1992). Our 
inference is that the class-based discrimination in education did not last long enough to 
make the oppressed group become accustomed to it.  
With reference to Eastern Europe, our study presents another pattern of the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality in economic transition.  Szelényi’s ‘interrupted 
embourgeoisement’ account states that, in rural Hungary, well-off families could transmit 
their family resources by placing them in the education and politicoeconomic systems under 
the socialist regime. In rural China, there had been very few opportunities in the 
politicoeconomic system for well-off families to place their family resources. Instead, 
landlord/rich peasant families created an education-oriented family culture that positively 
influenced children’s education after the collapse of the rural class system. 
 
  31. Introduction 
This paper examines the determinants of intergenerational correlation of education in 
rural China by using a large survey of household data. Three generations who completed 
education during the period from pre-1949 to the beginning of the 2000s are included. 
The focus is on the influence of family class status (chengfen) on offspring education. 
Our empirical results suggest that family class status, which is generally believed to 
have become irrelevant after the 1980s, is still important for the intergenerational 
transmission of education. The offspring of landlord/rich peasant families are more 
likely to achieve higher educational attainment, even though parental education, family 
wealth, and other family characteristics are the same. The unique path for the 
intergenerational transmission of education in the postreform era is found to be an 
education-oriented family culture, created as an intergenerational cultural reaction 
towards class-based social discrimination during the Maoist era. 
The data source for this paper is a nationally representative rural household survey 
conducted in 2003 by the Chinese Household Income Project, the Institute of Economics, 
and The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in collaboration with several 
foreign institutes (hereinafter referred to as the 2002 CASS survey). The reference year 
is 2002.
1 The survey covers 9200 sample households distributed in 122 counties in 22 
provincial-level administrative units: Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang. The sampling 
frame for the survey was a subsample of the official rural household survey of the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 
Common explanations for the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status, 
in addition to the direct transfer of wealth through inheritance, focus on transmission of 
human capital over generations (Bowles et al. 2005; Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002; 
Grawe and Mulligan 2002; Solon 1992). Well-off families can invest more in children’s 
education. Another complementary trait is that wealthy parents usually have higher 
educational levels and parents’ education directly and indirectly affects children’s 
education (Figure 1A). Higher educational levels, then, enable children to attain higher 
economic status (Figure 1B).
2 It would be interesting to investigate to what degree these 
transmission paths of socioeconomic status are relevant in transition economies, which 
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system within a few generations. We intend to investigate this issue in the context of 
rural China during the period from pre-1949 to the beginning of the 2000s. In the 
present paper, we concentrate on the intergenerational correlation of education. Then, in 
a forthcoming paper, we will proceed to a more comprehensive investigation of the 
transmission paths of family socioeconomic status by examining offspring employment 
status, income and wealth, political status, and other related factors. 
Figure 1 Reference framework 
Szelényi’s ‘interrupted embourgeoisement’ account can be used as a reference 
framework for the intergenerational transmission of human capital in transition 
economies. Szelényi, using extensive household survey data in rural Hungary at the 
beginning of the 1980s, argued that the old rural bourgeoisie and other entrepreneurial 
families (especially ‘kularks’ and ‘middle peasants’) could exploit the new market 
opportunities of the mixed economy after the 1980s by placing their family resources 
(education, occupational skills, and so on) in the educational and politicoeconomic 
systems under the socialist regime. Based on the estimation of agricultural production, 
Szelényi also stated that the more prosperous families under collectivization and the 
peasant entrepreneurs who took advantage of the opening up of the market after the 
1970s seemed to be the descendants of families who had been well off and 
entrepreneurial before the socialist transformation. That is to say, the process of 
‘embourgeoisement’ had been interrupted during the socialist regime in rural Hungary 
(Szelényi 1988). From the standpoint of comparative economic transition, it will be 
interesting to compare rural China with rural Hungary. 
We are unaware of any previous literature that directly examines the effects of family 
class status on offspring education using large household survey data that can represent 
rural China.
3 The only literature that directly relates to our study is by Deng and 
Treiman (1997). Deng and Treiman, using the 1982 census, claimed that the educational 
attainment of men is highly egalitarian with respect to social origins and has become 
increasingly so over time, although discrimination in education existed against sons of 
‘bad class origin’ during the Great Cultural Revolution. They emphasize the weak 
association between fathers’ socioeconomic status and sons’ educational attainment and 
the existence of strong state intervention behind that. Although we acknowledge that the 
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intervention to expand school education after 1949, both in urban and rural areas, we 
would emphasize the significance of the long-term influence of social discrimination.
4 
Firstly, we intend to elaborate the class-based discrimination in education through 
estimations of the determinants of educational level by birth cohorts and by social 
environments that would affect the degree of class-based discrimination. Secondly, we 
will see what has happened to the intergenerational correlation in education in the 
current younger generation who completed education after the 1990s. One advantage of 
our study is that we asked directly about family class origin and the previous 
generation’s educational level in the household questionnaire. 
Other relevant literature includes Ting (2004), who analyzed trade-offs between 
quantity and quality of children in urban and rural areas, using a fertility survey 
conducted in Hubei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai in the mid-1980s. According to Ting, urban 
white-collar families had fewer, but better educated, children than their blue-collar 
counterparts, whereas no difference was found in lifetime reproductive strategy between 
families of different socioeconomic statuses in rural areas. Drawing on Ting’s argument 
and taking into account the fact that the difference between families in the number of 
children is relatively small in rural China (compared with other developing counties) 
because of family planning policy, in this paper we do not consider the quantity–quality 
trade-off. Instead, we focus on the influence of the previous generation’s education and 
class status on the next generation’s education. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the framework of study, 
outcome measures, working hypotheses, and method of empirical analysis. In Section 3, 
we examine the intergenerational correlation of education by using historical birth 
cohorts and focusing on the significance of fathers’ educational level and family class 
status. Then, in Section 4, we investigate the determinants of educational attainment of 
the current younger generation by employing family wealth and other family 
characteristics as well as parental education. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
  62. Framework of research 
Family class status 
The major constraint for our study is that we have no information on the income and 
wealth of families in the pre-1949 era. We employ family class status (jiating chengfen) 
designated at the Land Reform period as the proxy of family socioeconomic status in the 
pre-1949 era. 
Table 1 classifies family class status of our sample households by agricultural 
macroregions (nongye quhua).
5 In the overall sample, landlord/rich peasant, middle 
peasant, and poor and lower-middle peasant comprise 6.4 percent, 19.3 percent, and 
74.4 percent respectively. There are no large regional differences in the class structure 
between agricultural macroregions and between old revolutionary regions (laoqu) and 
other regions. Note that, for this Table and the following empirical analysis, we exclude 
sample households located in atypical agricultural regions, specifically the Ganxin 
region (the northwestern part of Gansu and the whole of Xinjiang). Thus, our basic 
working data consist of 8362 households in 113 counties. 
Table 1 Class structure by regions 
A criticism will be raised that class status is a crude indicator of family 
socioeconomic status because the socioeconomic characteristics of a certain class (for 
example, landlords) vary considerably between regions and historical periods. First, 
there were large regional differences in the structure of land holdings prior to land 
reform. Second, the Communist Party’s policies for defining classes have changed over 
time, especially before and after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949. Generally, land reform during the civil war was radical and violent, whereas, after 
1949, it was relatively restrained. Third, class definition was a political process rather 
than an economic classification and, therefore, class status was strongly affected by the 
specific local political contexts.
6
Although we agree with these points, we still argue that class status is the second-best 
indicator of family socioeconomic status. Our rationale is as follows. First, although the 
economic substance of a certain class status varies over time and between regions, it is 
reasonable to assume that class status represents relative socioeconomic status within 
each of the regional units where the land reform policy had been implemented. If so, we 
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appropriate regional unit. Second, because class categories are a political label and their 
impact on Chinese peasants after the 1950s varies according to birth cohorts, we will be 
able to capture the unique characteristics of rural China’s socialism and market 
transition by an empirical investigation using class status. 
An appropriate unit for clustering households in the sample is the county level. This 
is because, throughout the process of land reform, the county was the basic unit for 
applying the Communist Party’s principles and policies to actual rural circumstances. 
For example, the typical method for supervising the land distribution process was to 
dispatch work teams (gongzuodui) organized at the county level to villages (Crook and 
Crook 2003/1959; Hinton 1997/1967). Therefore, in the following empirical study, we 
group sample households at the county level and assume that class status represents a 
common socioeconomic status within a county. 
The CASS 2002 survey provides information on the class statuses of the head of 
household’s and spouse’s parents. Based on this information, we adopt the following 
classification of family class status. 
(1) Landlord/rich peasant (dizhu/funong) family. A family where either the father or 
mother of the head of household is of landlord/rich peasant origin. This class category 
represents the former ‘exploitative’ class, and was regarded as the ‘enemy’ throughout 
the Maoist era. 
(2) Poor and lower-middle peasant (pinxiazhongnong) family. A family where both 
father and mother of the head of household are of poor and lower-middle peasant origin. 
They belong to the revolutionary class. 
(3) Middle peasant (zhongnong) family. Both father and mother of the head of 
household are of middle peasant origin, one of the parents is of middle peasant origin 
and the other is poor and lower-middle peasant origin. Rich middle peasant (fuyu 
zhongnong) and some other minor middle-class categories such as small landholder 
(xiao tudi chuzuzhe) and merchant (shangren) are classified into middle peasant. They 
belong to the ‘middle’ class, that is, the ally of the revolutionary class. 
Note that family class status is not just a proxy of socioeconomic status in the pre-
1949 era. As is well known, class status was the critically important political labeling 
during the Maoist era (Watson 1984). Family class origin, especially the father’s class 
origin, influenced children’s education, employment, party membership, and all other 
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families of landlord and rich peasant origin were, in company with ‘antirevolutionaries’, 
‘rogues’, and ‘right-wing factions’, called the ‘five blacks (hei wulei)’ and became the 
main target of the class struggle.
7
Historical cohorts 
For the purpose of our study, it is important to conduct the investigation by birth 
cohorts. When classifying birth cohorts, we should consider the unequal accessibility to 
education of different classes in different historical periods. Note that, because of the 
large gender gap in education, we concentrate on males (male household members, male 
heads of household, and their fathers) in the rest of this section and Section 3 (Figure 2, 
Tables 3, 5, and 6). The total number of current male household members is 12 939 
(Figure 2 and Table 3). Of the 8362 households that we cover in this study (Table 1), 
8358 households have male heads of household (Table 5). 
Figure 2A shows average years of education for all current male household members 
grouped into five-year birth cohorts.
8 From this figure, we can confirm that the 
educational level of peasants has been increasing steadily after the establishment of the 
People’s Republic, from 5.0 years in the 1935–1939 birth cohort to 8.6 years in the 
1975–1979 birth cohort. We can clearly see the expansion of school education after 
1949. In addition, we find fluctuations in education level among different class origins. 
Landlord/rich peasant family members born in the pre-1949 era had better education, as 
is expected. This trend was reversed for the 1945–1949 birth cohort and the education 
level of landlord/rich peasant family members became lower than their middle peasant 
and poor/lower-middle peasant counterparts. It is clearly shown that landlord/rich 
peasant family members were subjected to social discrimination. It is not until the 1960–
1964 birth cohort that the education level of landlord/rich peasant family members 
caught up with the other classes. 
Figures 2B and 2C focus on the two transitional birth cohorts: the 1945–1949 cohort 
and the 1960–1964 cohort. In the 1945–1949 cohort, we can confirm that the proportion 
of male members of landlord/rich peasant families who could not complete junior high 
school-level education increased after 1945 (Figure 2B). In the 1960–1964 cohort, we 
found a type of polarization in the educational attainment of landlord/rich peasant 
family members. Some of the landlord/rich peasant family members began to achieve 
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school or less educational attainment is still higher in the landlord/rich peasant family 
members than in others (Figure 2C). These findings suggest that, for the 1945–1949 
cohort, class-based disparity in education level could be seen at the junior high school 
level. This was the first transitional cohort when the overall average length of education 
was around six years. In the second transitional cohort, the1960–1964 cohort, the overall 
average length of education had increased to approximately eight years, and gaining 
entry into senior high school became the important crossroad in educational attainment. 
Figure 2 Average completed education of male household members 
Thus, it will be appropriate to classify the historical birth cohorts for empirical 
analysis by year at age 12 (the transition from primary school to junior high school) and 
age 15 (the transition from junior high school to senior high school). Specifically, we 
classify household members into the following four historical cohorts (see Table 2). 
(1) Pre-Maoist cohort. This cohort consists of those who were born before or during 
1944 (age at 2002: 58–88 years). They had reached the age of 12 years before 1957, the 
year when the Advanced Agricultural Production Cooperatives (gaoji nongyeshengchan 
hezuoshe) had covered the entire rural area and when large political campaigns, the 
Rural Socialism Education Movement (nongcun shehuizhuyi jiaoyu yundong) and the 
Anti-Rightist Movement (fan youpai yundong), had started. 
(2) Mid-Maoist cohort. This birth cohort consists of those who were born between 
1945 and 1959 (age at 2002: 43–57 years). Those who belong to this cohort reached the 
age of 12 years after 1957 and 15 years before the end of the Great Cultural Revolution. 
(3) Late-Maoist cohort. This birth cohort includes those who were born between 1960 
and 1965. They reached the age of 12 years during the Great Cultural Revolution and 15 
years after the Great Cultural Revolution. This cohort is a transitional cohort from the 
Maoist era towards Deng Xiaoping’s reform era. 
(4) Postreform cohort. Those who were born after 1965 are included in this birth 
cohort. They reached the age of 12 years after 1978, the year of transition from the 
Maoist period to the reform period, which is illustrated by the third plenum of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (December 1978) and the official 
announcement to abolish family class origin as the measure of political accreditation 
(January 1979). 
  10Table 2 Classification of historical cohorts 
Table 3 Family class status and educational level of current male household members 
Table 3 summarizes the association between educational level of current male 
household members and family class status by historical cohorts (P indicates the 
significance level of chi-square test of independence between educational level and class 
status). It is confirmed that the educational level of male members of landlord/rich 
peasant families is significantly higher in the pre-Maoist cohort (P = 0.016) and 
becomes significantly lower in the mid-Maoist cohort (P = 0.001). It is also found that, 
although not statistically significant, the proportion of landlord/rich peasant family 
members having nine years or above of education has caught up with other classes in the 
late-Maoist cohort and becomes slightly larger than poor and lower-middle peasant 
families in the postreform cohort. 
Coverage and bias 
Note that this paper does not cover those who had changed their household 
registration (hukou) from rural to urban status (nongzhuanfei) by entering college, 
becoming party/government cadres, or joining the army. Since those who were able to 
change household registration status in the Maoist era basically belonged to families of 
‘good class’, it is assumed that we do not capture highly capable persons of poor and 
lower-middle peasant origin who had left rural areas during the Maoist era.
9 This could 
be a possible source of bias for our empirical analysis. However, since the numbers of 
rural people who had changed household registration status, especially during the 
Maoist era, is very limited, we think that the bias would not be very serious. 
Working hypotheses 
Taking the common explanations for intergenerational transmission of education and 
Szelényi’s account into consideration, Table 4 illustrates the framework of the empirical 
study in this paper. 
We cover three generations. The first generation (grandfather’s generation) is the 
generation of fathers of current male heads of household. The second generation 
(father/parent’s generation) is the generation of current male heads of household and 
  11their spouses. The third generation (children’s generation) is current younger family 
members living with their parents and aged over 15 and under 25 in 2002 (Table 4A).
10
The outcome measures for offspring education are as follows: (a) years of education 
completed by male heads of households for the 2nd generation’s educational level, and 
(b) dummy variable for whether or not children have entered senior high school (or 
equivalent schools) for the 3rd generation’s educational level (Table 4B). 
Table 4 Framework of the empirical study 
Regarding the two intergenerational correlations of education, between the first and 
the second generations and between the second and the third generations, we propose 
the following transmission paths, working hypotheses, and measurements (Table 4C). 
(1) Investment in offspring education 
For the pre-Maoist cohort, we hypothesize that landlord/rich peasant families were 
better able to invest in education than were their middle peasant and poor/lower-middle 
peasant counterparts. We also assume that this transition path had been blocked by the 
thorough collectivization in the late 1950s (the mid-Maoist and late-Maoist cohorts) and 
that family wealth began to matter again after the 1980s (the postreform cohort). For 
measurements to examine this transmission path, we utilize family class status dummy 
variables (Table 5) and family wealth in 2002 (Table 8). 
(2) Previous generation’s educational level 
The measurements for grandparent/parent’s educational level are years of education 
completed. We hypothesize a common path of intergenerational transmission of 
education and expect a positive influence of grandparent/parent’s education on 
children’s education. At the same time, taking the rapid expansion of education after 
1949 into consideration, we anticipate that the intergenerational correlation in education 
is less strong. 
After considering these common transmission paths, we proceed to introduce the 
following two factors that we anticipate will represent the unique historical 
characteristics of rural China after 1949. 
(3) Class system and class-based discrimination 
Our inference is that, unlike the case in rural Hungary, there were few chances for 
well-off families in the pre-1949 era to preserve their family resources in the economic 
and sociopolitical system after 1949. We anticipate that, because of the strict political 
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discriminated against in school education. 
(4) Family culture 
We hypothesize that, in addition to wealth and education of previous generations, 
other family characteristics that can be classified under the general term of family 
culture also matter in the intergenerational correlation of education. Our intention in this 
paper is to characterize family culture that is specific to rural China. Bearing in mind the 
drastic politicoeconomic changes and class-based opportunity structure in the Maoist era, 
we anticipate that we would find cohort-specific and class-specific family culture. 
Estimation method 
Family class status has dual meanings: as a proxy of economic status in the pre-1949 
era and as a measurement of political status during the Maoist era. As discussed above, 
when we use class status dummy variables as proxies for economic status in the pre-
1949 era, it is necessary to group sample households into appropriate clusters and 
introduce an estimation method for grouped observations. When we treat class status 
dummy variables as the indicators of political status during the Maoist era, we will be 
able to introduce them without a strict clustering procedure. 
For the estimation method with clustering, we employ here a two-level hierarchical 
linear model (HLM) clustering at the county level, that is, the basic unit of land 
reform.
11 In this model, households are grouped into counties and county characteristics 
are assumed to exercise a common influence on all households within the county. The 
two-level HLM is structured as follows. When there exists one household level 
characteristic (x) and one county level characteristic (z) that influence the household 
level dependent variable (y), the micro (household) level model is written as: 
yij = β0j + β1j xij + εij,   (1a)
where ε is the micro error term, and subscript i represents the household, and j the 
village. The macro (county) level model that includes county characteristics (z) is 
described as: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01zj + δ0j,   (1b) 
β1j = γ10 + γ11zj + δ1j,   (1c) 
  13where the subscript j indicates the county, and the δ is the macroerror term. 
Substitution provides the following two-level HLM: 
yij = γ00 + γ01zj + δ0j + (γ10 + γ11zj + δ1j) xij + εij
= γ00 + γ10xij + γ01zj + γ11zj xij + (δ0j + δ1j xij + εij). (2) 
Equation (2) illustrates that the household level dependent variable y is a function of 
the following components: overall intercept γ00 that demonstrates the grand-mean effect, 
the main effect of county characteristics z (γ01), the overall slope γ10 (the average x–y 
regression slope across county) that represents the main effect of household 
characteristics x, the cross-level interaction of household and county characteristics (γ11), 
and random effects (δ0j + δ1j xij + εij).
12
 
3. Intergenerational correlation of education by historical cohorts 
Education of male heads of household 
In this section, we examine the intergenerational correlation of education between 
fathers of male heads of household (fathers, the first generation) and male heads of 
household (sons, the second generation). The outcome measure is years of education 
completed by male heads of households. The focal independent variables are (a) father’s 
educational level (years of education completed), (b) family class status (class status 
dummy variables), and (c) interactions between these two variables. Considering the 
upward trend of average educational level after 1949, we control (d) age of male heads 
of households. Because we treat family class status as the proxy of socioeconomic status 
in the pre-1949 era as well as the indicator of political status after 1949, as is explained 
above, we employ a two-level HLM nested at the county level. Table 5 reports the 
estimation results by historical cohorts. The following points can be seen from the 
results. 
Table 5 Determinants of educational level by historical cohorts, two-level HLM 
estimation 
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between landlord/rich peasant status and father’s education level suggests that the 
positive influence of the previous generation’s educational level had been enhanced in 
landlord/rich peasant families (equation 2 of Table 5)
13, whereas landlord/rich peasant 
status itself is not statistically significant (equation 1 of the table). These findings imply 
that the major transmission path for education in landlord/rich peasant family members 
is the previous generation’s education rather than the family’s economic status. In 
contrast to landlord/rich peasant families, the coefficients for middle peasant status are 
positive and significant both in equations 1 and 2, suggesting that middle peasant status 
has an independent effect on offspring education. A possible explanation for the 
different results between landlord/rich peasant and middle peasant families is that 
middle peasant families were more likely to include families who were employed in 
commerce and industry in the pre-1949 era and such families tended to be more 
interested in offspring education than were their poor/lower-middle peasant and 
landlord/rich peasant counterparts. 
Second, in the mid-Maoist cohort, we have confirmed a negative relationship 
between class status and offspring education as was expected (equations 3 and 4 of the 
table). The coefficients for landlord/rich peasant status and its interaction with father’s 
education have become negative and statistically significant, clearly showing the 
discrimination in education against landlord/rich peasant families. It is also notable that 
the coefficients for father’s educational level had become smaller than those for the pre-
Maoist cohort. This finding reflects the rapid expansion of school education in the 
Maoist era. 
Third, in the late-Maoist cohort, the coefficient for landlord/rich peasant family 
returned to positive, although not statistically significant. This reflects the above-
mentioned polarization in the education level of the landlord/rich peasant family 
members (Figure 2C) and shows the transitional characteristics of this particular cohort. 
Fourth, turning to the postreform cohort, it is noteworthy that the effect of 
landlord/rich peasant is positive and statistically significant (equation 7 of the table). It 
is clearly shown that sons of landlord/rich peasant families who completed education in 
the postreform era are more likely to achieve higher educational level. Moreover, 
interaction values indicate that the effect of father’s education is enhanced in 
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peasant status has no statistically significant effects in this birth cohort. 
Intergenerational cultural rebound effect 
Why, then, do male heads of households from landlord/rich peasant families 
belonging to the postreform cohort tend to have higher educational attainment? Our 
inference is that class-based discrimination in education during the Maoist era had 
created a psychological or cultural rebound among landlord/rich peasant family 
members (fathers) and they tended to have stronger incentives to encourage their sons’ 
education after class-based discrimination was abolished at the end of 1970s (hereinafter 
referred to as the intergenerational cultural rebound effect). 
When we employ this argument, the following opposing working hypotheses about 
the relationship between the degree of discrimination and the degree of cultural rebound 
could be made: (1) the strength of cultural rebound positively correlates with the degree 
of discrimination (the rebound is stronger where the previous generation suffered more 
greatly from discrimination) (hereinafter referred to as the proportional rebound 
hypothesis); and (2) the strength of rebound negatively correlates with the strength of 
discrimination (a cultural resignation, or fatalism, rather than rebound or protest, is 
likely to occur where severe discrimination existed) (hereinafter referred to as the 
cultural resignation hypothesis). Because we can anticipate that the attitudinal responses 
of individuals/families towards social discrimination are distributed randomly, here we 
try to test the two hypotheses outlined above by introducing the factor of social 
environment that affects the degree of class-based discrimination. 
Specifically, we divide sample households into two groups according to the basic 
social environment under which they achieve education: (a) families living in non-
multisurname villages, that is, villages where families with the most commonly 
occurring surnames comprise more than half of the total number of families; (b) families 
living in multisurname villages, that is, villages where families with the most commonly 
occurring surnames comprise less than half of the total. The assumption behind this 
classification is that class-based discrimination could be mitigated where a strong 
kinship relationship exists between landlord/rich peasant families and other families. 
Then, we reestimate the effect of family class status according to this typology of social 
environments and compare the effects for the mid/late-Maoist cohorts and the 
  16postreform cohort. Since we group observations by village characteristics and we are 
interested in class status as the indicator of political status, we employ here OLS 
estimation instead of two-level HLM clustered at the county level. For the non-
multisurname villages, we extract the landlord/rich peasant families who have the most 
commonly occurring surname (daxing) in the village in order to capture the influence of 
kinship relations more accurately. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. The results seem to support the 
proportional rebound hypothesis: first, in the mid/late-Maoist cohorts, we have found 
that landlord/rich peasant status has a stronger negative effect on offspring education in 
multisurname villages than non-multisurname villages. This finding implies that class-
based discrimination in education was likely to be more severe in multisurname villages. 
Second, in the postreform cohort, we found a positive and larger coefficient for 
landlord/rich peasant status in multisurname villages, suggesting that the cultural 
rebound for offspring education is stronger where discrimination during the Maoist era 
was more severe. 
Table 6 Educational level of male heads of households of landlord/rich peasant origin, 
by social environment 
Another factor to be considered is the stage in an individual’s life cycle when she/he 
suffered from discrimination. By referring to the literature on lifespan development 
psychology and family sociology, we hypothesize that the long-term response to social 
discrimination is stronger when one suffers from discrimination during one’s 
adolescence (hereinafter referred to as the adolescence hypothesis).
14 To confirm this 
point, we have employed a dummy variable for fathers of male heads of households who 
were born during 1947–1953; that is, they were aged 12–18 years when the severe ‘class 
struggle’—the Four-Cleanup (siqing) Campaign and the Great Cultural Revolution—
occurred. Then we extract landlord/rich peasant families and reestimate the effects of 
father’s age, 1947–1953 birth cohort, and education level. If the adolescence hypothesis 
is applicable, we anticipate a positive coefficient for the 1947–1953 birth cohort dummy. 
The result is shown in Table 7. It is consistent with our assumption. The 1947–1953 
birth cohort coefficient is positive and significant as expected, suggesting that there was 
a stronger cultural rebound towards the next generation’s education among fathers of 
  17landlord/rich peasant families who had experienced the turmoil in the education system 
and class-based discrimination in education during their adolescence. 
Table 7 Influence of father’s birth cohort on educational level of male heads of 
household of landlord/rich peasant families, the postreform cohort, OLS 
 
4. Determinants of educational attainment of the current younger generation 
In this section, we proceed to the analysis of the intergenerational correlation of 
education between current male heads of households (the second generation) and their 
children (the third generation). We define children here as the children of male heads of 
households who live with their parents and who are aged over 15 and under 25 years in 
2002. Children-in-law (e.g. wives of married sons) are not included. Here, we are able to 
elaborate on the findings of the previous section by adding new variables for family 
characteristics such as family economic status. 
The outcome measure is the dummy variable indicating whether or not children 
entered senior high school (or equivalent schools). As the outcome measure is binominal, 
we employ logit estimation. Since we concentrate on children who have completed 
education since the 1990s and, therefore, family class status is regarded as the indicator 
of political status, it is not necessary to consider clustering of observations at the county 
level. Instead, we group observations for the same household and conduct a robust 
estimation. 
Focal independent variables are as follows: (a) father’s years of education completed, 
(b) mother’s years of education completed, (c) father’s school performance,
15 (d) 
grandfather’s (father of father) years of education completed, (e) 1947–1953 birth 
cohort dummy variable for father, (f) father’s age, and (g) family class status. To control 
the children’s characteristics, we employ (h) children’s age and (i) children’s gender 
(dummy for male). As the proxy of long-term economic status of the family, we 
introduce (j) family wealth in 2002 (per capita amount of family assets, 2002).
16 To 
control the level of regional economic development, we employ (k) logit-transformed 
proportion of nonagricultural GDP to total GDP at the county level. 
We also introduce the following interaction measures between family class status and 
other focal variables: (l) 1947–1953 birth cohort dummy and family class status, (m) 
  18father’s education and family class status, and (n) family wealth and family class status. 
These are to determine whether the effects of father’s age, father’s education, and family 
wealth differ according to family class status. The estimation results are summarized in 
Table 8. The following points can be made from this table. 
Table 8 Determinants of the educational level of the current younger generation, logit 
estimation 
First, the effects of children’s age, children’s gender, and the level of regional 
economic development are consistent with our general knowledge of rural China and 
with the literature on intergenerational correlation in education (equations 1–6 of Table 
8). The negative and statistically significant coefficient for age reflects the improvement 
in the average level of education. The male dummy is positive and significant, which 
shows the gender gap in education. The level of regional economic development also 
has a significant effect, reflecting the large regional disparity in education caused by the 
highly decentralized fiscal system for education throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Second, it is confirmed that family wealth has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on children’s educational attainment as was expected (equations 1–6). This 
finding, along with the result of the effect of regional economic development, suggests 
that there will be increased disparities in educational level between different regions and 
between households with different economic conditions in the future. 
Third, after controlling age, gender, family wealth, and the regional economic 
condition, the parent’s, especially father’s, education level significantly influences 
children’s education (equations 1–6). Both the father’s and the mother’s education are 
proved to have positive and statistically significant effects on their children’s education. 
It is interesting that the effect of the father’s education is larger than that of the mother’s. 
It is also notable that father’s school performance positively and significantly affects his 
children’s educational attainments. The grandfather’s education also has a positive 
effect, although it is not statistically significant in all the equations. 
Fourth, we have confirmed that the adolescence hypothesis is applicable not only for 
landlord/rich peasant families but also for entire families (equations 2–6). Father’s 
1947–1953 birth cohort dummy is positive and statistically significant, implying that 
this specific birth cohort has a more positive attitude towards children’s education, and 
is distinct from differences in other family characteristics. We assume that this cohort-
  19specific effect reflects intergenerational cultural rebound against the turmoil in the 
education system during the latter half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. We 
can also see class-specific effects for landlord/rich peasant families by the positive and 
statistically significant interaction value for the 1947–1953 birth cohort and 
landlord/rich peasant status (equation 4). 
Fifth, when all other factors are equal, family class status still has a significant effect 
and children of landlord/rich peasant families are likely to have higher educational 
attainment (equation 3). Moreover, interaction values for landlord/rich peasant status 
with father’s education shows that the positive effect of father’s education is enhanced 
in children of landlord/rich peasant families (equation 6). 
 
5. Conclusion 
So far, we have examined the intergenerational correlation of education in rural 
China, using data from a large household survey of three generations who completed 
their education during the period from pre-1949 to the beginning of the 2000s. It is 
generally believed that family class origin, which influenced almost all important life 
events of Chinese peasants throughout the Maoist era, had become irrelevant after the 
official abolition of the class system at the end of the 1970s. Contrary to this common 
understanding, our empirical analysis has shown that families of different class origin 
differ in their collective orientation to offspring education even in the postreform era. It 
has been found that the children of landlord/rich peasant families who have completed 
education after the 1990s are more likely to achieve higher educational attainment, when 
other family characteristics are equal. 
The unique determinant of offspring education in the postreform era is an 
intergenerational culture within which family members act. We have found that 
landlord/rich peasant families tend to have a family culture characterized by a positive 
attitude toward offspring education. We argue that this unique family culture was 
created as a psychological rebound against class-based discrimination in education 
during the Maoist era. We call this the intergenerational cultural rebound effect. This 
argument is supported by the finding that the degree of significance of the positive 
effect of landlord/rich peasant status on the education of offspring who completed 
  20education in the postreform era varies depending on the social environment. The degree 
of significance is lower in non-multisurname villages, where class-based discrimination 
was supposed to be mitigated by kinship ties, than in multisurname villages. 
In addition to the rebound effect among landlord/rich peasant families, we have 
found a cohort difference in the strength of the rebound effect. The 1947–1953 birth 
cohort has positive attitudes toward children’s education that are distinct from 
differences in other family characteristics including class status. This finding implies a 
long-term response to social events in one’s adolescence, specifically, the turmoil in the 
education system in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. We have also found that this cohort 
effect is stronger in landlord/rich peasant families, who suffered from severe 
discrimination at that period. That is, the intergenerational cultural rebound is a 
compound of a class-specific effect with a cohort-specific effect.
17
With reference to the comparison with rural Hungary, we conclude that, as far as 
intergenerational transmission of education is concerned, the major transmission path in 
rural China is different from rural Hungary, although there is a common outcome. Those 
who have upper- or nonrevolutionary class origin are more likely to gain advantage in 
education after the beginning of economic transition. As is summarized by Szelényi’s 
‘interrupted embourgeoisement’ account, in rural Hungary well-off families could 
transmit their family resources by placing them in the education and politicoeconomic 
systems under the socialist regime. In rural China, where entire rural families had 
experienced collectivization and repeated political campaigns until the late 1970s, there 
had been very few opportunities in the politicoeconomic system for well-off families to 
place their family resources. Instead, landlord/rich peasant families created an 
education-oriented family culture that positively influenced children’s education after 
the collapse of the rural class system. 
Why, then, did rebound rather than resignation become the major form of reaction 
against class-based social discrimination in rural China? As is emphasized in A. K. 
Sen’s criticism of utility as a measurement of well being, a common reaction of 
oppressed people against ‘long-standing deprivation’ is resignation rather than protest 
(Sen 1992, 55). Our inference is that the class-based discrimination in education did not 
last long enough to make the oppressed group become accustomed to it. If the 
discrimination had continued so as to affect two generations’ education and become an 
entrenched inequality, resignation instead of rebound might overwhelm the family 
  21culture of the ‘bad class’ families. Such family culture could then negatively influence 
human capital formation and the lifelong economic status of their offspring. 
Our next step is to elaborate the paths of intergenerational transmission of family 
resources by taking other resources such as political status, occupational skills and 
experiences into consideration. Specifically, we will examine how family characteristics 
of the previous generation including class status influence the current generation’s 
income and wealth. This task will be done in our forthcoming paper.
18
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222.Figure 1 Reference framework 
1A: Intergenerational transmission of education 
 
 




                                                         Hc Offspring education 
 
 
       Ep Parents’ education 
 
 
1B: Intergenerational correlation of socioeconomic status 
Cp Family class status                            Hc Offspring human capital 





                             Yc Offspring income and wealth 
Source: the author. Figure 2A Average completed education of current male household members, by family 
class status 



















































Poor and lower middle peasant
 
Note. This figure reports averages of years of education completed by all current male 
household members born before 1980. 
  27Figure 2B Percentage of those who have primary school or less educational attainment, 
born between 1940 and 1947 
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  28Figure 2C Percentage of those whose educational attainment is primary school or less, or 








































































































[Primary] Poor and lower-middle peasant
[Senior high] Landlord/rich peasant
[Senior high] Poor and lower-middle
peasant
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Table 1 Class structure by regions (%) 
 Overall  Agricultural  macroregions 
 














73.4  70.6 71.8 77.3 68.8 
Total 
 




(8362)  (898)  (2839) (3335) (1290) 
Notes. For this and all subsequent tables, household data compiled from the 2002 CASS survey are 
used. 
Old revolutionary region indicates counties where the Communist Party had its revolutionary bases 
before 1945. Agricultural macroregions are as follows. Northeastern: Liaoning, Jilin. Northern: 
Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, Anhui (Huaibei region), Jiangsu (Huaibei region), Shaanxi, and 
Gansu (excluding Ganxin region). Southern: Jiangsu (Huainan region), Anhui (Huainan region), 
Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Southwestern: Sichuan, Chongqing, 
Guizhou, and Yunnan. Ganxin region (the northwestern part of Gansu and the entire Xinjiang) is 
excluded because it is not a typical agricultural area.   31




















male heads of 
household who 
belong to each 
cohort (%)  





1931–1956 1934–1959 1949:  the  establishment  of 
the People’s Republic 
 
 14.6 (1217) 





1957–1971 1960–1974 1957:  the  collectivization 
of agriculture, the rural 
socialism education 
movement, the antirightist 
movement 
 
 46.9 (3924) 





1972–1977 1975–1980 1966–1976:  the  Great 
Cultural Revolution 
1976: the destruction of 
the Gang of Four 
 
 19.8 (1652) 





1978–1994 1981–1997 1978:  the  third  plenum  of 
the 11th CPC Central 
Committee 
1979: abolition of family 
class origin as the 
measurement of political 
accreditation 
 
 18.7 (1565) 
Total 
 
      100.0  (8358) 
Notes. Number of observations (male heads of household) in parentheses. Male heads of household 
who were continuing education in 2002 are excluded.   32











       
4 years or less  34.9  35.6  43.9  41.3 
5–6  years  26.9 29.0 27.3 27.6 
7  years  7.4 9.4 7.8 8.1 
8  years  8.1 6.0 5.2 5.6 
9  years  12.1 13.3 11.2 11.7 








P = 0.016 
Mid-Maoist 
cohort 
       
4 years or less  21.0  14.5  15.2  15.4 
5–6  years  33.2 23.2 23.1 23.7 
7  years  11.9 16.0 15.2 15.2 
8  years  11.9 11.0 12.5 12.2 
9  years  15.4 23.8 22.1 22.0 








P = 0.001 
Late-Maoist 
cohort 
       
4 years or less  3.1  3.9  5.5  5.0 
5–6  years  18.8 13.3 13.0 13.4 
7  years  16.7 13.3 15.6 15.2 
8  years  15.6 25.7 25.5 25.0 
9  years  22.9 26.0 21.9 22.7 








P = 0.273 
Postreform 
cohort         
4 years or less  4.1  4.6  3.8  4.0 
5–6  years  12.1 12.4 13.5 13.2 
7  years  4.4 6.1 7.7 7.2 
8  years  28.6 25.1 26.5 26.4 
9  years  29.8 33.5 31.6 31.9 
10 years or more 
 








P = 0.113 
Notes. This covers current male nonstudent household members over 18 years old. Number of 
observations in parentheses. P indicates the significance level of the chi-square test of 
independence between family class status and education level. Transmission path  Working hypothesis 
Applicability to rural China 
Measurements 
1. Investment in 
offspring education 
YES, in the pre-Maoist cohort 
NO, in the mid-Maoist and 
YES, in the postreform cohort 
Family class status 




YES  Years of education completed (fathers 
of male heads of household, male 
heads of household and their spouses)
3. Class system and 
class-based 
discrimination 
YES, in the mid-Maoist and the 
late-Maoist cohorts. What 
happened in the postreform 
cohort? 
Family class status 
 
4. Family culture  YES, there exist class-specific and 
cohort-specific family cultures 
Family class status 
1947–1953 birth cohort dummy 
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Table 4 Framework of the empirical study 
4A Three generations to be studied 








3rd generation (children)  Current younger family members aged over 15 and under 25 years 
 
4B Outcome measures (offspring education) 
(a) 2nd generation’s educational level 
Male heads of household’s years of education completed (years) 
(b) 3rd generation’s educational level 
Dummy variable for whether or not children have entered senior high school (or equivalent 
schools) 
4C Transmission paths, working hypotheses, and measurements 
 Table 5 Determinants of education level of male heads of household by historical cohorts, two-level HLM estimation 






    (1)                        (2)  
Mid-Maoist 
      (3)                      (4)  
Late-Maoist 
      (5)                     (6)  
Postreform 
(7)                (8) 
Micro (household) level variables                 


























–0.621   
































Interaction values                 
Father’s education × landlord/rich 
peasant 
             


































Number of observations (male 
heads of household) 

















Random effects parameters 



















































Notes. This table reports the estimation results of the effects of father’s education and family class status on male head of household’s education. 
  34Two-level HLM nested at the county level. As is mentioned in the text, because we are interested in family’s class status as the indicator of economic status in 
the pre-1949 era as well as political status after 1949, we employ two-level hierarchical linear model HLM nested at the county level. Total number of 
observations is 8358. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Denotes statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Because 
of multicollinearity, family class status dummies are omitted in equations with interaction values. 
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Table 6 Educational level of male heads of household of landlord/rich peasant origin, by social 
environment 
6A Average years of education of male heads of household 
 Non-multisurname  villages 
 
Multisurname villages 
 All  Landlord/rich 
peasant with the 
most commonly 
occurring surname 
in the village 


















6B Effect of family class status on male heads of household’s education, OLS 
Dependent variable: Years of completed education of male heads of household who belong to the mid-
Maoist cohort and the postreform cohort 










































Completed education of fathers of 





























Adjusted R squared  0.178 0.179 0.116 0.117 
Number of observations 
(male heads of household) 
1883 3693  473 1092 
Notes. The coverage of observations is same as Table 5 (Total number of observations is 8358). Since 
we are interested in the influence of family class status as the indicator of political status and we need 
to group observations by village characteristics, we employ OLS, instead of two-level HLM nested at 
the county level. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level, 
** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.   37
Table 7 Influence of father’s birth cohort on educational level of male heads of household of 
landlord/rich peasant families, the postreform cohort, OLS 
Dependent variable: Years of completed education of male heads of household of landlord/rich 































Number of observations (male heads of household of landlord/rich 
peasant families) 
103 103 
Adjusted R squared  0.158  0.154 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, * at the 10% level. Table 8 Determinants of the educational level of current younger generation, logit estimation 
 
 
Dependent variable: dummy variable indicating whether or not children over 15 years old 
entering senior high school (or equivalent schools) 
Independent variables  (1)      (2)      (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family characteristics             












Mother’s years of education completed
 
     
 
       
   
   
         
   
       
       
         
   
0.056  0.064  0.064 0.063  0.064  0.064
(4.89)***  (5.43)*** (5.41)***
 
  (5.36)***   (5.42)*** (5.42)***
Grandfather’s years of education completed
 
0.023 0.028 0.015 0.022  0.021  0.015
(1.31)  (0.83) (1.60)*  (1.28)   (1.19)   (0.83)
Father’s good school performance (dummy) 
 
0.363  0.338  0.314  0.317  0.322  0.318 
(2.39)**  (2.11)**
 
(2.25)**  (2.13)**   (2.15)**   (2.13)**
 
Father born in 1947–1953 (dummy) 
 
  0.180  0.187  0.095  0.182  0.185 
  (2.27)** (2.18)**  (1.07)   (2.21)**   (2.25)**
Father’s age    –0.020  –0.021  –0.021  –0.021  –0.020 
  (0.34) (0.31)  (0.34)   (0.33) (0.32)
Father’s age squared    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.61)
 
(0.61)  (0.63)   (0.61) (0.59)
 
Family wealth  0.033  0.034  0.034  0.034  0.031  0.033 
(7.74)***  (7.78)*** (7.74)***  (7.78)***   (6.97)*** (7.76)***
Individual characteristics             
Male (dummy)  0.214  0.217  0.219  0.218  0.217  0.218 
   
       
   
(3.80)***  (3.88)*** (3.86)***  (3.85)***   (3.85)*** (3.87)***
Age –0.340  –0.363 –0.364   –0.364 –0.364  –0.363
(26.56)***  (25.26)*** (25.32)***  (25.27)***   (25.31)*** (25.24)***
Regional characteristics             
Level of regional economic development  0.182            0.186 0.184 0.185 0.184 0.184
 (5.38)***  (5.45)*** (5.52)***  (5.46)***   (5.45)*** (5.45)*** 
Family class status             
Landlord/rich peasant family (dummy)      0.407       
  3839
         
 
   (3.13)***
Middle peasant family (dummy) 
 
    0.131       
  (1.60)*          
Interaction values of class status             
Father born in 1947–1953 × Landlord/rich peasant family            0.610
          
          
           
        
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
            
           
     
  (2.55)**




















Constant 4.685 4.991 5.033 5.049  5.057 5.036
(17.49)***  (3.32)*** (3.31)***  (3.35)***
 
  (3.34)***  (3.434)***
Number of observations (persons)  6566  6566  6566  6566  6566  6566 
Pseudo R squared  0.159  0.162  0.164  0.163  0.163  0.164 
Notes: Current younger generation is defined as children aged over 15 and under 25 years in 2002 and living with parents. Children-in-law are not included. 
Estimations are conducted by grouping observations of the same household. Absolute values for robust z statistics for grouped data in parentheses. *** 
Denotes statistically significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.   40
                                                
 
 
1 For the details of the sampling framework and sampling method, see Gustafsson, Li, and 
Sicular (2007). 
2 Previous studies have shown that genetic inheritance (IQ) plays a very limited role in the 
intergenerational transmission of economic status (Bowles et al. 2005, 9–12) 
3 For urban China, there are several previous studies, such as Zhou, Moen, and Tuma (1998). 
4 A weakening of the intergenerational correlation of education after the 1950s is common in 
East Asian economies. See, for example, Lillard and Willis (1994). 
5 For classification of the agricultural macroregions, see Guojia Ditu Bianji Weiyuanhui 
(1989).  
6 See, for example, Zhang and Zhao (1985) for changes in the reform policy and the regional 
variations of the reform process. 
7 The opposite of ‘five blacks’ is ‘five reds’ (hong wulei), which means revolutionary 
soldiers, revolutionary cadres, workers, poor peasants, and lower-middle peasants. For the 
structure of the class system and ‘class struggle’ in the Maoist era, see for example, 
Huang (1995), Watson (1984), Unger (2002), and Zhang (1998). For accounts of the 
discrimination in education by class origin in the Maoist era, see Unger (1982). 
8 Note that Figure 2 includes only current members of the household. Fathers of heads of 
household who are not current household members are not included. 
9 In the postreform era, new rural–urban mobility pathways, such as obtaining urban 
household registration status by purchasing real estate in an urban area, have been 
emerging. In the postreform era, purely economic factors, rather than political factors, 
mainly determine access to opportunities for changing household registration. 
10 Because of the large gender gap in education before 1949, we concentrate on the 
intergenerational correlation of education of male household members for simplification. 
Regarding the correlation between parents and children, children do not include children-
in-law (wives of married sons living with parents). 
11 Details of the methodology of the hierarchical linear model are given in Kreft and De 
Leeuw (1998) and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). Another method is to employ group 
dummies, specifically county dummies. However, employing large numbers of group 
dummies will not be appropriate. 
12 Equation (2) can be written as the combination of the fixed part E(yij) = γ00 + γ10xij + γ01zj + 
γ11zj xij, and the random part yij – E(yij) = δ0j + δ1j xij + εij. As for random effects, δ0j 
indicates the deviation of each village from the grand mean and δ1j indicates the unique 
increment to the overall slope associated with village j. In a hierarchical linear model, the 
first level variables can be measured either in their original levels (raw score form) or as 
deviations from the county mean (group-mean centered form). We conduct estimations 
using equations in both raw score form and county-mean centered form. A county-mean 
centered first level variable x ij is equal to x ij = xij – x j, where xij is the raw score for 
household i in county j and x j is the county mean of the variable for county j. Both 
approaches are instructive. If one wants to explain as much variation in the dependent 
variable as possible, the raw score form is useful. If one is interested in particular county-
level effects and cross-level interactions between the county and the household levels, a 
county-mean centered model with the reintroduction of county-mean variables is 
appropriate (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). In the following empirical study, we employ the   41
                                                                                                                                                       
raw score form because we are interested in whether the household level variables 
exercise significant effects. 
13 Because of multicollinearity, family class status is omitted in equations with interaction 
terms. 
14 See, for example, Bengtson et al. (2002) and Staggs and Riger (2005). 
15 Father’s school performance at the junior high school (performance at the primary school 
if fathers do not have junior high school-level education). 
16 Family assets include total value of durable goods, housing, financial assets, and fixed 
assets for family production at 2002 price levels. 
17 For a general discussion on the significance of cohort-specific factors in the creation of 
social strata in the Maoist era, see Davis-Friedman (1985). 
18 Hanley and McKeever (1997), using large social mobility and life history surveys (1983, 
1992), found another mechanism for the persistence of intergenerational inequality 
education in Hungary under the socialist regime, namely the strong incentive for 
administrators and professionals to transmit their education to their offspring. We will 
also examine the case in China using urban samples of the 2002 CASS survey in our 
future research. 